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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----~~~----~-~-------~-------~~----~--------------~----
IN RE THE MATTER 
OF CASE NUMBER 16853 
NELDA BOYER 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE~NT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Nelda Boyer, a 39 year old woman, 
is said to be suffering from some degree of mental. retar-
dation. The State has imposed a guardian on her; the 
guardian has the power to make the most fundamental kinds 
~ 
of decisions affecting the liberty and property of Nelda 
Boyer. The guardian is granted these powers by Utah's 
Guardianship Statute although the statute's defined stand-
ards are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Second Judicial District Court of Weber 
County, State of Utah found that: 
a. Appellant was an incapacitated person 
as that term is defined in Rule 75-1-201 of 
Utah Code Annotated. 
b~ Appellant is in need of a guardian. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks that the trial court's 
order declaring Nelda Boyer incapacitated and in need 
of a guardian be set aside. 
Appellant asks that Utah's Guardianship 
Statute §75-1-201 be declared unconstitutional for the 
reason that it is overbroad and vague on its face or, 
alternatively, that the trial court's finding be set 
aside since Utah's Guardianship Statute §75-1-201 as 
applied to Nelda Boyer is unconstitutionally overbroad 
and vague in that it violates Nelda Boyer's due process 
rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a 39 year old woman. For 
most of her life she lived with her father and elderly 
mother in Reno, Nevada. Five years ago her father, who 
had been extremely ill, died. Because of his illness, 
appellant's father remained home and as testimony indicates, 
both father and daughter had established a very close 
relationship based on mutual care. (Transcript, p. 7) 
Soon after appellant's father died, 
appellant's mother began visiting a family therapist in the 
state of Nevada. (Transcript, p. 60) · Mr. Wayne Abbott, 
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the family therapist, analyzed the family relationship and 
concluded that appellant was the cause of the family dis-
ruption G (Transcript, p. 58) He therefore, recommended 
that appellant be separated from the mother. (Transcript, 
p. 58) He declared her incapacitated (Transcript, p. 52) 
and in need of a guardian. (Transcript, p. 57) Mre 
Abbott also recommended that Mre Kershaw's Jefferson 
Manor located in Ogden, Utah, serve as appellant's new 
home. (Transcript, p. 58) 
During the summer of 1979, appellant was 
invited to Ogden, Utah, by her relatives~ Testimony 
confirms that the invitation to visit was extended for 
the purpose of getting appellant into Utah in order to 
facilitate confining appellant at Jefferson Manor and 
having her declared "incapacitated" and in need of Mr. 
Jerry Kershaw, as guardian. (Transcript, p. 89) 
On September 6, 1979, appellant contacted 
Utah Legal Services. In preparation for this action 
appellant was referred to Doctor Richard T. Grow for a 
psychological evaluation at the joint request of the 
Division of Rehabilitation Services of Utah and Utah 
Legal Services. Dr. Grow is a psychologist and Chairman 
of Weber State College Department of Psychology. He has 
ten years experience ih this field. (Transcript, p. 178) 
He concluded that appellant was mildly mentally retarded, 
but did not recommend the imposition of a guardian. 
(Transcript, p. 185) 
- 3 -
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During the trial, Sharon Tanner, a friend 
of the Court in this matter, recommended that a guardian 
be appointed. (Transcript, p. 82) She elaborated that 
Mr. Kershaw should not be appointed guardian, however, 
since several state agencies were presently investigating 
his nursing homes and many of them would not recommend him. 
(Transcript, p. 95) Mrs. Tanner also stated that her 
findings, as presented to the Court, were based on Mr. 
Abbott's report and on appellant's family testimony. 
(Transcript, p. 90) Mrs. Tanner admitted not knowing that 
Mr. Abbott was not a psychologist although she presumed 
that he was when she used his report. (Transcript, p. 90) 
Mrs. Tanner never made her own psychological evaluation of the 
appellant nor had the Court given Mrs. Tanner any guide-
lines or procedures in-pursuing her evaluation of the 
appellant for the Court. (Transcript, p. 89) 
Prior to the trial, Mrs. Tanner's report was 
presented to the opposing attorney. Based on Mrs. Tanner's 
findings of Mr. Kershaw, this action's original Complaint 
was amended so as to withdraw Mr. Kershaw as guardian and 
substitute appellant's sister, Mrs. Susie Rice, as 
guardian. (Transcript, p. 109) 
The testimony given at trial shows that 
appellant was 35 years old before she was formally declared 
mildly mentally retarded. (Transcript, p. 108) For the past 
35 years appellant was presumed to be a "slow learner". 
(Transcript, p. 108) Evidence presented at the trial shows 
that Nelda Boyer can read (Transcript, p. 5) , write (Trans-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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A DETERMINATION OF MENTAL 
INCAPACITY UNDER THE UTAH 
GUARDIANSHIP STATUTE RESULTS 
IN A SEVERE DEPRIVATION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES. 
In reviewing Utah's Guardianship Statute 
§75-5-312, Nelda Boyer requests this Court to seriously 
review the substantial deprivation that results from a 
finding of mental incompetency. It has been said that 
no other judicial determination causes such a complete 
loss of the basic rights of citizenshipe See G. Alexander 
and T. Lewin'~ The Aged and the Need for Surrogate Manage-
ment (1972) (hereinafter referred to as 'Alexander and 
Lewin). In this review, Nelda Boyer asks that the Court 
keep in mind a famous dissent of Justice Brandeis: 
Experience should teach us to be most 
on our guard to protect liberty when 
the government's purpose _is beneficient 
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in 
the insidious encroac:hment }?ymen of zeal, 
well-meaning but without understanding. 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.Se 438 
479 (1928) Brandeis,J., dissenting. 
A finding of mental incompetence and the im-
position of a general guardianship transfers that person's 
basic civil rights to the guardian. "The guardian 
- 5 -
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assumes respon~ibility for virtually every decision in the 
life of the ward." J. Regan and G. Springer, "Protective 
Services for the Elderly," A Working Paper Prepared 
for The Special Corrunittee on Aging, United States Senate 
(July, 1977) (hereinafter "Regan and Springer."). 
An incompetent's loss of rights not only 
includes those usually recognized by courts such as the 
right to sue, make a contract, purchase and sell property, 
marry or vote, but also may result in the loss of other 
less obvious but equally fundamental rights. Among 
the recognized rights of citizenship which an adjudged 
incompetent is denied are: the right to go from place 
to place as he/she pleases _Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) ; to meet with persons 
in public places for social or political purposes .Coates 
v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) ; to privacy 
of marriage and family life Roe v. Wade, 460 U.S. 113 
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U~S. 479 (1965) ; 
the right to choose a physician and to determine appro-
priate medical care .Roe v. Wade, supra ; the right 
to be left alone Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 507 (1969) 
and the right to retain a favorable reputation Wisconsin 
v. constautineau, 400·U.S. 433 (1971) . As one prominent 
commentator has recently remarked, "In a society which· 
- h -
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venerates liberty, conservatorship is an anachronism." 
G. Alexander, "Who Benefits from Conservatorship", 13 
Trial 30, 32 (May, 1972). 
Moreover, a limited discussion of the rights 
deprived by the imposition of a guardianship would ignore 
the profound psychological impact of a judicial decree 
of incompetence. The United States Court of Appeals 
recognized this impact in Dale V. Hahn, 440 F2d. 633 
(2nd Cir. 1971): 
Although the plaintiff requests recovery 
of money alleged to be illegally spent 
by the (guardian), any right she may 
have to the money is not the critical 
interest sought to be protectede The 
important ones are, rather, those 
affected by the declaration that she 
was incompetent to handle her own 
affairs. The stigma of incompetency, 
the implication that she has some 
kind of mental deficiency, with 
attendant untrustworthiness and 
irresponsibility, and the conse-
quences to her reputation and her 
normal human relationships with others 
in her community involve more than a 
property right, Id at 636. 
Not only does a declaration of incompetency 
result in giving a guardian the absolute right to deter-
mine a ward's physical environment, but, in many cases, 
it is tantamount to orde.rin.g that t.he ward be. institutiona-
lized. Alexander and Lewin noted in their study of more 
than 600 cases that there was a remarkably high correlation 
- 7 -
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between finds of incompetency and subsequent institutional-
ization: 
not only is a person found to be 
incompetent bound to be deprived 
of his right to manage his pro-
perty, but is very likely to lose 
his liberty in the process. Re-
ported in Hearings on Legal f roblems 
Affecting Older Americans Before 
the Special Committee on Aging, 
United States Senate, 9lst Cong., 
2d Sess. 12 (1970). 
This direct loss of freedom as a result of 
guardianship determinations is confirmed by a study con-
ducted in San Diego which concluded that despite an 
attempt to keep persons in the community, legal inter-
vention through incompetency proceedings caused higher 
rates of institutionalization then otherwise would have 
occurred. Horowitz and Estes, "Protective Services for 
the Aged", (1971). 
POINT II. 
THE STATE'S INTEREST IN IM-
POSING GUARDIANSHIP OVER 
PERSONS DETERMINED TO BE 
"INCAPACITATED" UNDER UTAH'S 
STATUTORY SCHEME DOES NOT 
OUTWEIGH THE FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS OF PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY. 
The United States Supreme Court stated in 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1976), that the 
right of privacy embraces a " ... general individual in-
terest in independence in making certain kinds of impor-
tant decisions." Nelda Boyer's privacy right to make 
y 
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destroyed when guardianship was imposed upon hero She 
is no longer given the right to make any of the funda-
mental decisions concerning everyday lifee As a result 
of this intrusion, she is denied one of the basic com-
ponents of "liberty" protected by the United States 
Constitution Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, (Roe v. Wade, 410 UeS. 113, 152-53 (1973) and 
the Due Process Clause of Utah's Constitution. 
In cases where state legisl~tion has the 
effect of intruding on personal privacy or autonomy, the 
Supreme Court has balanced the state's interest allegedly 
promoted by the statute and the personal privacy and 
autonomy interests. Griswold Vo Connecticut, 381 UeSo 
479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This in-
terest balancing approach requires that, in order for the 
statute to stand, the weight of the state interest must 
outweigh the fundamental privacy interest: 
Where certain fundamental rights are 
involved, the Court has held that a 
regulation limiting these rights may 
be justified only by a 'compelling 
state interest' ... and the legisla-
tive enactments must be narrowly 
drawn to express only the legiti-
mate state interests at stake ... 
(Roe v. Wade at 155). 
There is no legitimate, compelling state 
interest which can outweigh appellant's personal privacy 
- 9 -
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right. The legislative purpose is to protect those 
persons who are "incapacitated" and who, according to 
Utah Statute §75-1-201, "lacks sufficient understanding 
or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions 
concerning his person". The paren patriae doctrine 
espoused by the statutory scheme may at one time h~ve 
been viable. In many situations, however, the imposition 
of a protector over a person who the state determines to 
be unable to succeed on his own, results in a deprivation 
and a hindrance upon that person's potential and in-
dividuality. With the availa~ility today of numerous 
special programs for retarded individuals including: 
special education programs, programs teaching self-care 
skills, and the possibility of supervised living, the 
limited state interest is far outweighted by the appellant's 
privacy interest: 
Individuals who are classified as 
mentally retarded •.. constitute 
approximately 89% of all persons 
classified as retarded, and, 
although limited in their potential 
for academic achievement, can 
utilize special education techni-
ques to achieve self-sufficiency 
as adults. (Emphasis added) The 
Mentally Retarded Citizen's Civil 
Rights at page 188. 
- 10 -
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POINT III. 
THE STATUTE PROVIDING FOR THE 
IMPOSITION OF GUARDIANSHIP OVER 
"INCAPACITATED PERSONS" DEPRIVES 
THE PERSONS SO CLASSIFIED OR CER-
TAIN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTSe THIS 
COURT SHOULD, THEREFORE, APPLY 
STRICT SCRUTINY TO THIS STATUTORY 
CLASSIFICATION AND REQUIRE THAT 
THE STATE SHOW A COMPELLING STATE 
INTEREST TO JUSTIFY THE STATUTEQ 
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201 (18) defines 
an "Incapacitated person" as "any person who is impaired 
by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical 
illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of 
drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause (except 
minority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient under-
standing or capacity to make or communicate responsible 
decisions concerning his person 19 • UoSoC. §§75=5-303 and 
75-5~304 state the procedure for court appointment of a 
guardian for an "incapacitated person". Section 75-5-303 
provides that, "(l) The incapacitated person or any person 
interested in his welfare may petition for a finding of 
incapacity and appointment of a guardian". Section 75-5-304 
states that, "The court may appoint a guardian as requested 
if it is satisfied that the person for whom a guardian is 
sought is incapacitated and that the appointment is nee-
cessary or desirable as a means of providing continual 
care and supervision of the person of the incapacitated 
person". 
- 11 -
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Nelda Boyer was found by the court to be an 
"incapacitated person" because of mental deficiency. She 
was described at the hearing as being "mildly mentally 
retarded". (Transcript, p. 52). A retarded individual is 
entitled to equal protection of the law (U.S. Const. Amend. 
XIV, Sec. 1) and possesses certain fundamental rights, the sam1 
fundamental rights possessed by all other citizens of the 
United States. In order for the state to infringe on these 
rights, it must show a compelling state interest. (Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. ~~ , 
395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969) .) Even if the state is able to show a compelling 
state interest, the "legislative enactments must be narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate state.interests at 
stake". (Roe v. Wade, supra.) 
A retarded person determined by the court to 
be an incapacitated person under Utah's statutory scheme 
loses all of his legal rights. He loses the right to choose 
where he shall live and where he shall travel; he loses the 
power to consent to or refuse to submit to medical treatment 
or other professional care and treatment; he loses all power 
of control over his property and loses the right to enter a 
contract. (U.C.A. §75-5-312) In essence, the person upon 
whom guardianship is imposed loses the right to make any 
decision concerning the fundamental rights to liberty and 
property. 
- 1?. -
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There is no compelling state interest to 
justify such a sweeping classification of persons whose 
rights are so broadly limited. 
Various conceptions of the retarded 
individual have been advanced to 
justify denying the retarded citizen 
the same rights, needs and desires 
enjoyed by other memebers of the society 
•.. The retarded individual may be seen 
as an object of pity deserving of a 
paternalistic environment which shelters 
him against injury and risk and makes 
few demands on his personal growth, 
development, and responsibility. Fry, 
The Mentally Retarded Citizen's Civil 
Rights, 47 UMKC Law Review No. 2, at 
189. 
The parens patriae stance which the state has 
assumed cannot possibly be characterized as promoting any 
compelling state interest required to justify the pervasive 
and dehumanizing effects of the statute. 
POINT IV$ 
PERSONS SAID TO BE MENTALLY RETARDED 
ARE DEPRIVED OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
WHEN GUARDIANSHIP IS IMPOSED ON THEM: 
THE STATE HAS CREATED A SUSPECT 
CLASSIFICATION WHEN IT MOVES TO 
DEPRIVE SUCH PERSONS OF THEIR RIGHTS. 
THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD GIVE 
SPECIAL SCRUTINY TO THIS STATE ACTION, 
TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WHO 
ARE HELPLESS AT LAW TO PREVENT THIS 
ACTION FROM BEING TAKEN AGAINST THEM. 
Persons said to be mentally retarded suffer 
the loss of any or all legal rights, except those specifi-
cally protected by state law, from the time the state determines 
them to be in need of a guardian. In addition, such persons 
- 13 -
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suffer the stigma of being labelled mentally retarded and 
treated for any or all purposes from the perspective of 
a society which presumes they are in need of help. 
In this respect, persons said to be mentally 
retarded are treated differently from anyone said to be 
physically ill. Except for some adults who are forced to 
undergo blood transfusions contrary to their religious 
beliefs, no state has a law requiring person over the age 
of majority to be involuntarily hospitalized or treated to 
protect his own welfare. See, Note, 48 Temple L. Quarterly, 
354. 372 (Winter 1975). 
A number of commentators have tried to express 
what it means to individuals to be "culturally defined" as 
mentally retarded and consequently treg.ted as such by society.' 
See, e.g., Herr, Civil Rights, Uncivil Asylums, and the 
Retarded, 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 679, 681 (1974); E. Goffman, 
Stigman: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Indentity 
(1963); S. Mercer, Labelling the Mentally Retarded (1972); 
R. Hurley, Poverty and Mental Retardation: A C-asua·l Re-
lationship (1969). 
Mentally retarded persons, for example 
have been cast into a number of destruc-
tive models which have justified rejection 
and exclusion from the mainstream of 
society (Wolfensberger, 1972). The fol-
lowing models are still relatively common 
today: 
1. The subhuman organism .... 
- 1'1 -
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2. The menace .... 
3. The object of pity .... 
4. The eternal child ..... 
5. The diseased organism •... 
The implications of each of these models are 
highly destructive--they virtually assure 
that retarded persons will be effectively 
isolated from community life and denied 
access to IIJCU?.Y of those services which are 
essential to function as an effective 
human being. Roos, "Basic Facts About 
Mental Retardation, "published in Vol .. I 
of the Legal Rights of the Mentally 
Handicapped, at page 17, by the Practicing 
Law Institute in 1974. 
The myriad of rights that can be taken from persons labelled 
as mentally retarded are documented and cited in Vol .. II in 
an article by W. Carnahan on "Rights to Love, Marry and 
Bear Children, Hold Property, Have a Job and Go to Court," 
beginning at page 1015. 
The total picture of the plight of mentally 
retarded persons subjected to imposed guardianship was 
painted this way in 1963 by the President's Commission on 
Mental Retardation: 
Most States' provisions for guardianship 
of the retarded are relics of a time 
when the mentally retarded individual 
was considered an incompetent who had 
to be kept away from normal social 
contacts. They largely consider or 
assume the retarded person to be without 
rights, deny him due process or the 
equal protection of the laws, and often 
encumber his family's estate for years 
at the price of the State's assuming 
his care. The damage done to retarded 
- , i:: -
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individuals who are capable of self-
support and self-reliance to those 
who have become caught up in the judi-
cial process, and to families who can 
in effect be held responsible for a 
retarded individual into a second 
generation is incalculable. Stone, 
"The Aging", in Mental Health and 
Love: A System in T·ransition, 
National Institute of Mental Health 
P. 136 (1975). 
Why don't more lawyers get involved 
in mental retardation? Quite simply, 
because there is no money in it .•.. 
It is time for all of us, lawyer and 
layman alike, to realize that the 
retarded person pays his horrible 
price in legal, social and human 
deprivation through no fault of his 
own. Haggerty, et al., "An Essay on 
Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded", 
Family L. Quarterly 138, 149. 
This dismal portrait of the mentally retarded 
has caused at least one commentator, S. Herr, supra, to call 
for the diagnosis to be treated as one creating a suspect 
classification, at 690, and one court to draw the same 
inference of a need for such a classification, to protect 
this discrete and helpless minority from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion, In re G. H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974). 
See the rationale behind such a classification, in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n4. 
(1938). Certainly persons said to be mentally retarded 
should benefit from a close judicial scrutiny as that accorded ; 
to illegitimate persons or women. New Jersey Welfare Rights 
- , ~ -
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Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 S. Ct. 1700 (1973); 
Frontiero V. Richardson, 411 beS. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1964 (1973). 
And something more than a rational basis must be offered by 
these state defendants to justify the procedures and stand-
ards adopted to subject persons said to be mentally retarded 
to imposed guardianships. 
THE UTAH GUARDIANSHIP STATUTE FAILS 
TO LIMIT THE DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS 
TO ONLY THOSE NECESSARY TO PROTECT 
THE WARD. 
Arguably the imposition of a guardian and 
the taking of necessary protective measures is legitimate 
when the state's compelling interest is to preserve the 
health, life and well-being of its citizens. Assuming this 
to be true, a state may not adopt means to' this end which 
involve a deprivation of rights and liberties more extensive 
than necessary to protect the individual. The Utah Guardian-
ship Statute unconstitutionally violates this principal. 
There are persons who are totally unable 
to make or convey decisions about their lives (a comatose 
individual is an obvious example). There are also many 
retarded persons who are in fact fully capable of providing 
for their own needs: 
Approximately 89% of retarded 
- 17 -
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individuals are mildly mentally 
retarded, 6% are moderately re-
tarded, and only 5% are severly 
and profoundly retarded. It is 
generally accepted that the mildly 
retarded are capable of economic 
self-sufficiency, and the moder-
ately retarded can be economic-
ally productive in sheltered em-
ployment. Roos, Basic Facts 
About Mental Retardation, in 
Legal Rights of the Mentally 
Handicapped, (PLI 1974), ·at p. 19. 
Between the above extremes lies a number of 
mentally retarded persons who are capable of managing some, 
but not all, of their personal or financial affairs. Such 
capabilities are easily evidenced in the particular in 
Nelda Boyer's case. 
The transcript shows that Nelda Boyer: 
1. Went to school through eighth grade 
ttranscript, p. 5) ; 
2. Is a bargain hunter ttranscript, p. 105); 
3. Can make decisions (Transcript, p. 55 & 82); 
4. Can take care of her hypoglicemia. (Transcripi 
p. 8 6.) ; 
5. Can shop (Transcript, p. 70); 
6. Can make change (Transcript, p. 75); 
7. Can formulate plans (Transcript, p.71); 
8. Can follow instructions (Transcript, p. 219) l 
9. Can cook (Transcript, p. 213); 
10. can prepare shopping a list (Transcript, p. 214 
11. Has proper hygiene (Transcript, p. 211); 
- , Q -
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13. Has dressing skills (Transcript, p. 211) ; 
14 .. Has house skills (Transcript, p. 211) ; 
15. Can read (Transcript, p .. 5) i and 
16. Can write (Transcript, p .. 5) • 
Appointment of a general guardian for a 
mentally retarded person who is partially competent argu-
ably runs afoul of the federal constitutional principle of 
"less drastic means" .. Sheldon v .. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 
488 (1960) .. 
The doctrine of the "least restrictive 
alternative" is forcefully presented in Sheldon vQ Tucker, 
where an Arkansas statute required teachers to disclose 
all organizations in which they held membership during 
the previous five years. In striking down this statute, 
the Supreme Court held that although the state had a 
legitimate concern in these matters: 
"that purpose cannot be pursued 
by means that broadly stifle 
personal liberties when the 
end can be more narrowly achieved .. 
The breadth of legislative abridge-
ment must be viewed in the light 
of less drastic means of achieving 
the same basic purpose.n Id at 488. 
- 19 -
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Such a restricted means was to limit inquiry into member-
ship that had been taken in any one of a list of subver-
sive organizations. This principle applies when govern-
mental action infringes upon a person's fundamental, 
constitutional rights. Where a compelling state interest 
is found for an infringement of a person's fundamental 
constitutional rights, this principle requires that the 
State's infringement occur in the least drastic manner 
consistent with its purpose. Arguably, the appointment 
of a plenary guardian for a person who is partially com-
petent does not satisfy the constitutional principle of 
"less drastic means" because a State could provide a more 
limited form of guardianship for that person. 
For example in the case of- Lake v. Cameron, 
364 F 2d. 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the doctrine of "least 
restrictive alternative" was applied to the civil-conunit-
ment field. In that case, an elderly woman was found wander-
ing the streets by a policeman and taken to the District of 
Columbia Hospital. There diagnosed as suffering from 
"chronic brain syndrome"; Mrs. Lake "demonstrated very 
frequent difficulty with her memory". Id at 658. 
- 20 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At the commitment hearing, two psychiatrists 
testified that Mrs. Lake was, because of her condition, 
mentally ill and although she was not dangerous to others 
and would not intentionally harm herself, was subject 
to "wandering away and being out exposed at night or any 
time she is out." Id at 657-658. The Court held that 
Mrs. Lake was not a proper subject for indeterminate 
commitment without full exploration of all other possible 
alternatives available for her care and treatment in the 
community including "an identification card on her person 
so that the police or others could take her home if she 
should wander ... " Id at 661. In conclusion, the Court 
said: "Deprivations of liberty solely because of dangers 
to the ill persons themselves should not go beyond what 
is necessary for their protection." Id at 660. 
Under the doctrine of the least restrictive 
alternative it becomes incumbent upon the state to fully 
explore all other measures to protect the individual& 
Guardianship proceedings do not exist in a vacuum. There 
are available many other social and legal devices that may 
be called into play to assist an individual of diminished 
capacity~ Legally less restrictive alternatives include, 
inter alia, agency relationships, of a general, limited or 
durable nature, forms of joint property such as joint bank 
accounts, and the Social Security Representative Payee 
- 21 -
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system. All these allow less restrictive means of handling 
property, paying bills, etc. 
In addition to these legal alternatives, social 
service support systems designed to assist individuals with 
limited impairments should be considered by the Court. These 
services include, inter alia, out-patient medical centers, 
home health aids, home help services (cleaning, cooking, 
assistance with personal care), geriatric day care, visiting 
nurses, transportation services, ch?re services and nutrition 
services all of 'Which .can be used as alternatives to the appointment of 
a guardian and, if appointment is necessary, as supplemental 
services for the ward. 
Mr. Gerald A. Miller, State Executive Director 
of the Utah Association for Retarded Citizens, made this 
clear during the trial when he described a variety of pro-
grams that do exist in Utah: 
There are a number of programs in Utah 
that affect the lives of all retarded 
from birth right up through death. The 
nurses at the Department of Health 
operate an early infant stimulation. 
Our public schools are charged by 
federal law to educate in the State 
of Utah from 5 to 21 years of age 
mentally retarded people. And we also 
have shelter workshops and work activity 
centers for retarded, in addition to the 
Department of Vocational Rehab services 
that offer services to the retarded. Utah 
also provides services through the State 
Department of Education, via the Voca-
tional Rehabilitation Services, which 
licenses work activity in shelter workshop 
agencies across the State. (Transcript, p. 205) ~ 
The attractiveness of the doctrine of least 
restrictive alternative is that it requires inquiry into how 
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the individual's "best interest" can be served while 
minimizing abridgment of fundamental liberties. In this 
respect, least restrictive alternative comports with the 
principal that due process is a "flexible doctrine and 
calls for such procedures as the particular situation 
demands". Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 
367 U.S~ 886, 895 (196l)o 
POINT VIo 
NELDA BOYER'S RIGHTS TO BE PROVED 
INCAPACITATED BY CLEAR AND CON-
VINCING EVIDENCE IS BEING DENIED. 
Despite the large number of guardianships 
imposed each year, appeals of incompetency determinations 
are rareo For example, a field study of 600 guardianship 
cases in New York did not uncover a single appeal of the 
trial court's ~indingso Ge Alexander & T. Lewin, at 29e 
This phenomenon is partially due to the fact that it is 
unlikely that a finding of incompetency will be overturned 
on appeal since state courts are most reluctant to set aside 
determinations of the trial court based on a de novo review 
of the evidence. Moreover, the standard of proof at a guardian= 
ship hearing is typically low, requiring only "clear and 
convincing" evidence. In Re Guardianship of Mills, 350 
Wis. 401, 27 N.W.2d 375 (1947), or some lesser quality 
and quantity of evidence such as mandated in Nelda Boyer's 
case which established that the necessity of appointing a 
- 23 -
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guardian rests wi.th the petitioner who only had to establish 
this need by a preponderance of the evidence. (Transcript, p.22 
In practice, the trial court's decision will be affirmed 
on appeal if there is any evidence in the record to support 
it. This attitude is reflected in Re Guardianship of 
·Walters, 37 Ca. 2d. 239, 245 (1951), enunciating the "sub-
stantial evidence" rule: 
All conflicts and any reasonable 
doubt as to the sufficiency of the 
evidence must be resolved in favor of 
the order •... In cases of this type, 
as in any other, we must uphold the 
findings of the trial court if there 
is any substantial evidence which, 
together with the aid of all in-
ferences to be drawn from it, tends 
to support the judgment. 
Because of threat of involuntary confinement, the loss of 
civil rights, the stigma of incompetency and the indeter-
minate nature of the adjudication, the Utah standard of 
proof is constitutionally inadequate. 
The United States Supreme Court held that proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence is insufficient in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings, saying that proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is required because it "is a prime instrument for 
reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error." 
In Re Winship, 397, U.S .. 358, 363 (1970). The higher 
standard of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, will 
not serve to preclude necessary guardianship actions; rather, 
it will serve to encourage caution in fact finding under 
- ?LI. -
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an incompetency proceeding. Moreover, it will reduce the 
likelihood of factual error, the imposition of unnecessary 
guardianships and the attendant deprivation of rights and 
liberties .. 
In the civil commitment area, Lessard v .. 
Schmidt, 349 F., Supp .. 1078, vacated and remanded for a more 
specific injunctive order, 945 S .. Ct .. 713 (1974), amended 
opinion, required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, stating; 
The argument for a more stringent 
standard of proof is more compelling 
in the case of a civil commitment 
in which an individual will be de-
prived of basic civil rights and be 
certainly stigmatized by the lack of 
confidentiality of the adjudication .. 
Id at 1095 .. 
Supporting the necessity for a higher standard of proof, 
In Re B~llay, 482 F 2d. (D .. C., Cir .. 1973), drew a distinction 
between commitment proceedings and other civil cases: 
Where the stakes are frequently 
economic and where 'we view it as 
no more serious in general for 
there to be an erroneous verdict in 
the plaintiffs favor .. ' Id at 663, 
quoting In Re Winship, 397 U .. S .. 
358, 391 (1970) 
Clearly the analogous situation prevails in incompetency 
proceedings where erroneous imposition of a guardianship can 
be so damaging to the affected individual. 
For these reasons, the Utah Guardianship 
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Statute should be held unconstitutional for failing to 
ensure that the proposed ward's conduct meets the statutory 
test of incompetency by clear and convincing proof. 
POINT VII •. 
ACCEPTANCE OF EXPERT WITNESS' 
TESTIMONY IS WITHIN PROVINCE OF 
THE TRIER OR FACTS: HOWEVER, IT 
IS INCUMBANT UPON THE TRIAL JUDGE 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRELIMINARY 
FACTS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED, UPON 
WHICH THE EXPERT MADE HIS OPINION. 
The general precedent is that the trial court 
is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in adrnissi-
bility of expert testimony, and in the absence of a clear 
showing of abuse, the reviewing court will not reverse. 
~ "'1 
Mal~uay v. Cox Const. Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979); 
Rodriguez v. McDonald Douglas Corp., 399 Ca. Rptr. 151 
(Cal. App. (1978); Fillmore City, v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 
(Utah 1977); State By and Through Road Commission v. Silliman 
439 P.2d 279 (Utah 1968); Marsh v. Irvine, 449 P.2d 602 (Utah: 
1969h Lamb v. Bangant, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974); Re Hanson, I 
87 Utah 580, 52 P.2d 1103 (1935); Re Christiansen, 17 Utah 
412, 53 P. 1003 (1898). 
In the case of Dobbs v. State 191 Ark. 236, 85 
S.W.2d 694 (1935), the court defines the criteria used 
to qualify witnesses as expert in the field of mental 
incompetency. The court oulined.the following three 
- 26 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
· criteria: 
1) as a general rule such witness 
should have a general knowledge of 
medicine as a practicing physician, 
a general knowledge of the mind and 
its functions and of mental phenomena 
and the disorders which attack the 
mind, although in some jurisdictions 
exceptions have been made permitting 
witnesses to testify as experts who 
did not possess all these qualifi-
cations of the insane; 
2) where the claimed mental derrange-
ment is of a common type, any re-
gular physician in good standing, doing 
general practice, and who has studied 
the diseases of the mind along with 
other diseases of the body can testify 
as an expert, the extent of his 
learning going alone to his credi-
bility; 
3) where the claimed insanity is not 
of the commoner type, but is of a rare, 
unusual, or complex nature, then the 
witness called as an expert should 
qualify by showing a reasonable amount 
of experience in the study and investi-
gation or observation of the kind or 
class of insanity under investigatione 
A general statement in case law regarding the 
qualifications of an expert witness can be found in Bratt 
v. Western Air Lines, IncG, 155 FG2d 850 (10th Cire 1946), 
wherein the court stated: "A witness is an expert witness 
and is qualified to give expert testimony if the judge finds 
that to perceive, know or understand the matter concerning which 
witness is to testify, requires special knowledge, skill, experience 
- 27 -
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or training and that the witness has the requisite special 
knowledge, skill, experience or training. " The. court further 
asserts that "whether a witness called to·testify to any 
matter of opinion -has s.uch qualifications and knowledge as 
to make his testimony admissible, is a preliminary question 
for the judge presiding at the trial, and his decision of 
it is conclusive, unless clearly shown to be erroneous as 
a matter of law. 
According to 40 A.L.R. 2d. §§63, 64, the 
situation where the mental condition of one sought to be 
put under or relieved of guardian is involved, the following 
factual bases are pertinent when the witness testifies to 
insanity or incompetency. The bases are divided into 
two categories: sufficient and insufficient. 
Nonexpert opinion evidence as to the incompe-
tency of one involved in guardianship proceedings·was held 
to have been founded upon a sufficient predicate of oppor-
tunity of observation and acquaintanceship where: 
the witness had known the person in question 
intimately for sixteen or more years. 
The sufficiency of this basis involves 
the witness's opportunity to observe the 
alleged incompetent. 
the witness had cared for the alleged 
incompetent. 
the witness had seen a great change in 
the incompetent. 
- ?Q '• r 
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wherein: 
Nonexpert opinion was held to be insufficient 
the witnes.s. had known the person in 
question several years, but had 
merely met him in passing. Re 
C'armichael (1860) 36 Ala .. 51~ 
the witness had known the person 
in question for sixteen years, 
but had never conversed with him. 
no statement of fact or recitation 
of conduct on the part of one for 
whom a guardian was sought to be 
appointed presented an unnatural 
or unusual situation, all the facts 
alleged being entirely consistent 
with the defendants' manner of life, 
his habits, his prejudices, and his 
conduct during the years when his 
mental capacity was not questionedc 
Caltriden v .. Sharon (1914) Iowa 287, 
145 N.W., 540 .. 
The credibility of the expert witness is 
described in the Fillmore case, suprae, as being a person 
with specialized knowledge in the field to the extent that 
his testimony.can be helpful to the jury on matters with 
which they personally are not familiar. His testimony may 
be received as an expert but whether he is so qualified 
rests within the sound discretion of the trial courtc The 
Mal tu}?y case, supra. , further describes the expert as someone 
whose knowledge may be acquired through experience as well 
as through formal education and studyc 
However, the Re Hanson holds that the 
opinion of a witness as to the mental condition of a testator 
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cannot be given unless the witness gives details of the 
underlying facts upon which the opinion is based. 
In the more recent case of State By and 
Through Road Commission, supra., the opinion in Re Hanson 
is upheld and further articulated when the court says, 
the qualification of an expert 
witness is to be determined by 
the trial judge, and if he deter-
mines that the witness by reason 
of training and experience can 
assist the jury by giving an opinion 
on a matter properly before the 
court, the Supreme Court, on appeal, 
should not hold that the testimony 
should be stricken unless such pal-
pable ignorance of the subject matter 
is manifested by the witness as to 
indicate an abuse of .discretion on 
the part of the trial judge in allow-
ing the witness to express an opinion 
in the first place or in refusing to 
grant a motion to strike after it is 
given. 
The Rodriguez case, supra., reiterates the 
issue of the trial judges duties by declaring, 
acceptance or rejection of expert 
witnesses is within the province 
of the trier of fact; however, it 
is incumbant upon the trial judge 
to determine whether the preliminary 
facts have been established, includ-
ing the foundation material upon which 
the expert made his assumptions. 
Ignorance of the subject matter and lack of 
determination of the preliminary facts upon which the experts 
found Nelda Boyer incapacitated abound in this trial: 
During the trial and over counsel's objection 
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(Transcript, p.50 & 52), Mr. Wayne Abbott was permitted to 
conclude that in his opinion: 
1. Nelda Boyer could not hold a job 
(Transcript, Pc 53); 
2. Nelda Boyer is mentally deficient 
(Transcript, p. 52) ; and 
3. Nelda Boyer is in need of a guardian~ 
(Transcript, p. 53) 
Nelda Boyer's counter-evidence serves to 
show that Mr. Abbott admits not being a psychologist, a 
medical doctor, nor a psychiatrist. (Transcript, po 59). 
Mr. Abbott also admits nqt testing Nelda Boyer in the 
manner a psychologist would have (Transcript, Pc 60) but 
states that his method is the same as used by psychiatrists 
(Transcript, Pe 66) even through he is not trained in said 
field (Transcript, p. 59). Mr. Abbott agrees with Doctor 
Grow's evaluation of Nelda Boyer (Transcript, p.58) even 
though Mr. Abbott never gave Nelda Boyer any of the tests 
used by Doctor Grow to evaluate Nelda Boyero These tests 
included: Human Figure Drawing, Wechsler Adult Intelligence, 
Gray's Oral Reading Paragraphs, Bender Gestalt, Graham 
Campbell Memory For Designs, Sentence Completion, the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Victorian 
and Rorschach Test. (Transcript, p. 180) Mr. Abbott also 
admits never visiting Nelda Boyer while Nelda Boyer worked 
at the MGM Hotel in Reno, Nevada. (Transcript, po64) 
Finally, Doctor Grow, the Chairman of the Department of 
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Psychology at Weber State College, who has ten years of 
clinical experience· and who has helped set up mental 
health programs within the State of Utah (Transcript, p. 178: 
concludes that if he had to choose between imposing a 
guardian on Nelda Boyer or grant her total independence, 
he, as a psychologist, would recommend to give Nelda Boyer 
her freedom. (Transcript, p. 185) 
Testimony given during the trial shows 
that Sharon Tanner, a social worker used by the Court, 
used Mr. Abbott's report to supplement her own report 
(Transcript, p. 90), but that she would have changed her 
report had she known Mr. Abbott was not a psychologist. 
(Transcript, p. 90) Mrs. Tanner also admits not having 
tested Nelda Boyer (Transcript, p. 89). Nelda Boyer's 
mother admits not knowing Mr. Abbott's credentials 
(Transcript, p._23). Her sister admits that Nelda Boyer's 
deficiencies are a product of no training (Transcript, p. 1091 
Testimony also shows that Nelda Boyer was living with 
her mother a person who is sensitive (Transcript, p. 107} 
and was close to a nervous breakdown (Transcript, p. 48). 
POINT VIII. 
THE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING 
WHETHER A PERSON IS "INCAP-
ACITATED" AS DEFINED IN 75-1-201 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED IS UN-
CONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD AND 
VAGUE. 
For the purposes of the imposition of a 
- ~? 
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guardian over an "incapacitated person", §75-1-201 Utah 
Code Annotated defines an "incapacitated person" as " .... 
any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, 
mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, 
advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, 
or other cause (except minority) to the extenb that he 
lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or 
communicate responsible decisions concerning his person." 
The appellant was found to fall within this definition 
because of a "mental deficiency", or mild mental retarda-
tion., (Transcript, p. 52) 
The indentification and treatment 
of the mentally retarded is, to a 
large extent, culturally definedo 
Those individuals who exhibit 
"significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functions, existing 
concurrently with deficits in adap-
tive behavior and manifested during 
the development period", are labeled 
retarded and are treated accordingly~ 
Exactly what constitute subaverage 
intellectual functioning, however, 
depends on relative concepts designed 
to fulfill the social need or desire 
to classify individuals who are 
considered inadequate or unable to 
perform so-called normal tasks~ 
"Retarded Citizens' Civil Rights", 
UMKC Law Review, Vol 47, No. 2, at 
page 187. 
The difficulty lies in the fact that the 
statute's terms are so amorphous and value-laden that their 
application to any particular fact situation is left to 
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the discretion of the decision-maker. Individuals whose 
competency is questioned find themselves having to defend 
any and every aspect of their personal lives since all is 
made relevant by the statute. 
The labels of "mentally retarded" or 
"mentally deficient" are vague and completely lacking 
of any satisfactory definition. The only criteria that 
the statute supplies is whether the person "lacks suffi-
cient understanding or capacity to make or communicate 
responsible decisions concerning his person". The 
Editorial Board Comment to §75-5-304 Utah Code Annotated 
discusses the term "incapacitated" as applied to the 
guardianship statute. It merely states ~hat, "It is 
assumed that the standards suggested by the definition 
in §75-1-201 (18) for the 'incapacitated' person are 
different from those which will determine when a person 
may be committed as ment~lly ill". The comment goes on 
to discuss where there might be an overlap between the 
two standards. It does not shed any light on the meaning 
of the language used to set up the standard for determining 
"incapacitated". 
In the criminal law context, courts frequently 
find statutes unconstitutionally vague both because their 
terms do not set forth precisely the conduct proscribed 
and because vague statutes provide no ascertainable guide-
lines to the decision-maker, thus inviting arbitrary 
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applications of the law. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972). 
Implicit in those decisions is the recogni-
tion that a vague standard is no standard at all. Not 
only the judge but the individual whose liberty interests 
are at stake must .guess at the meaning of the lawc As 
a result, his or her ability to prepare a meaningful 
defense is severely hampered or obliterated. One major 
function of the Constitution's guarantee of due process 
is the elimination of these practical obstacles, yet incom-
petency proceedings universally place alleged incompetents 
in such an unfair position. 
The use of imprecise language in the statute 
leads to the creation of a group of persons who suffer the 
consequences of the statutory definition needlessly. The 
United States Supreme Court has stated that where a state 
enacts legislation affecting "fundamental rights", the 
legislation, ".e.must be narrowly drawn to express only 
the legitimate state interests at stake". Roe v. Wade, 
(Supra). Certainly the state interest in providing "·•o 
for the care of a person who is unable to care for him-
self", (Editorial Board Comment to §75-5-304 U.C.A.) is 
not served by the use of a statute with such imprecise 
terminology that its application results in bringing per-
sons within its scope who were not intended by the legisla-
ture to be so placed. 
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The fact that appellant was afforded a 
hearing was represented by counsel and was assured 
procedural safeguards does not prevent the statute from 
being overbroad and vague. Nor can " •.. even strict 
construction of a statute ..• save it from a declaration· 
of unconstitutional if the language is so overbroad and 
vague, as to impose deprivation of rights from persons 
who should not have to forfeit them". Bell v. Wayne 
County General Hospital, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (1974). 
The statute provides that a person is 
"incapacitated" "to the extent that he lacks sufficient 
understanding or capacity to make or communicate respon-
sible decisions concerning his person". (Emphasi·s added) 
The statute does not establish the criteria for determining 
what is a "responsible decision concerning his person". 
In the vast array of decisions that a person makes daily 
concerning his person, it is a purely arbitrary classifica-
tion as to which are "responsible" decisions and which 
are not. Surely this clearly subjective, cultural standard 
cannot serve as a basis for stripping a person of his 
constitutionally-protected ·rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Nelda Boyer is now threatened with the 
severe curtailment of constitutionally protected 
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rights and liberties. The fundamental rights endangered 
include the right to contract and hold property, the 
right to live free of constraint, and the right to life 
itself c The state under its parens patriae power 
threatens abridgement of these rights under its guard-
ianship statute because Nelda Boyer is alleged to be 
mentally incapacitatede 
Moreover, as a result of this adjudication, 
persons of diminished functional abilities are subjected 
to plenary guardianships, even though a lesser deprivation 
could be adequate to protect the warde Permitting this, 
the Utah Statute endangers Nelda Boyer and other wards 
with the unnecessary loss of fundamental rights and 
liberties, including the right to decide her place of 
residence .. 
Due process of law will not permit such 
treatment of our citizens. The charade that the Utah 
Guardianship Statute is justified by the "best interest" 
doctrine cannot continue. Rather, instead of negating 
the individual and his capacity of self-autonomy, state 
law would do better to concentrate on treating the pro-
posed ward as a whole person, capable of guiding his own 
destiny and making his own life choices, until the con-
trary is proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
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Nelda Boyer requests this Court to find the 
Utah Guardianship Statute unconstitutional and to enjoin 
its enforcement against her in the specifics described. 
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